Abstract. We show that choosing an RSA modulus with a small difference of its prime factors yields improvements on the small private exponent attacks of Wiener and Boneh-Durfee.
Introduction
Let n be the modulus of an RSA key pair, i.e. a product of two large primes p, q. Let = |p − q| be the prime difference of n. We will assume that the bitsizes of the primes are equal, hence equal to half the bitsize of n, so that the prime difference is at most as large as n 1/2 . We note that when the primes are generated randomly and independently, then with overwhelming probability the prime difference will indeed be of the size of n 1/2 . So in practice one can easily avoid small prime differences.
It is common knowledge amongst cryptologists that a too small prime difference makes RSA insecure. Namely, then Fermat's factoring technique can be applied. Standards sometimes mention this and consequently require a certain condition on (e.g. ANSI X9.31 Sections 4.1.2 and C.3, see [ANSI] , requiring that the two primes differ in the first 100 bits). On this matter the more popular applied cryptography handbooks however are inadequate (such as [MvOV, Note 8.8 (ii)]) or even ignorant (such as [Sc, Section 19.3] ), while these books (the first one more clear than the last one) do warn against the much more sophisticated attacks suitable for extremely large prime differences, such as elliptic curve factoring.
When < n 1/4 (in fact we mean < cn 1/4 for a c that is constant compared to n, but now and in the sequel we will ignore such constants), then the Fermat factoring technique gives an almost instantaneous result. As we did not find such an (almost trivial) quantitative result in the literature (however, see [Si] ), we spend a few lines on it in Section 3.
Let e, d be the public and private exponents of the RSA key pair, which we assume to be reduced modulo φ(n) (the Euler totient function). Another well known attack on RSA, described by Wiener [W] (see also [VvT] ), uses continued fractions, and applies when the private exponent d is small. In particular, Wiener shows that RSA is insecure if d < n 1/4 . This result has recently been improved by Boneh and Durfee [BD1] , [BD2] , who (heuristically but practically) use LLL to show that RSA is insecure whenever d < n 1−1/ √ 2 = n 0.292... . They conjecture that the right bound below which RSA is insecure is d < n 1/2 (apart from an epsilon).
It is the main theme of this note to show that these results of Wiener and Boneh and Durfee can easily be improved under the condition that the prime difference is essentially smaller than its generic size of n 1/2 . When the prime difference gets as small as n 1/4 (below which Fermat factoring already shows that RSA is insecure), our bounds for d below which RSA is insecure reach the conjectured n 1/2 for Wiener's attack, and even reach n for the Boneh and Durfee attack. Consequently, checking the size of the prime difference becomes more important if one wants to generate key pairs with small private exponents, e.g. to improve performance of private key operations.
More specifically, let
(which is the proper range for β, as argued above), and let d = n δ . In Section 4 we show how Wiener's attack using continued fractions is effective whenever δ < ). We feel that our improvement to Wiener's attack will also go through for the extended Wiener attack as described by Verheul and Van Tilborg [VvT] , but we did not investigate this in detail.
In Section 5 we show how the first result of Boneh and Durfee [BD1] , that RSA is insecure when δ <
. Finally in Section 6 we show how the second result of Boneh and Durfee [BD2] , that RSA is insecure when δ < 1 − 1 2 √ 2, can be
, but under the condition δ > 2 − 4β. Note that these bounds equal the corresponding ones of Boneh and Durfee when β = 1 2 . The second bound is better, but holds only when β > 3 8
. The first bound approaches δ < 1 as β approaches 1 4 . Our main result, superseding all the others, is now given some status.
Observation Let p, q be large primes of about the same size, and let n = pq. Let = |p − q|. Let e, d be integers > 1 and < φ(n), satisfying ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(n)). Put = n β and d = n δ . Given only n and e, the factors p, q of n and the number d can be recovered efficiently whenever 2 − 4β
The relevant regions for δ and β are visualized in Fig. 1 , which is strong enough to resist our attack, but for smaller bitsizes (such as 1024, see the big dot in Fig. 1 ) leaves only a small margin.
Boneh and Durfee present heuristics to support their conjecture that the bound for δ below which RSA may be proved insecure is 1 2
. The same heuristic argument shows in our situation that the bound for δ, as a function of β, below which RSA may be proved insecure, is 3 2 − 2β. As this bound is an elegant , we are tempted to conjecture it as the true bound (whatever that means).
For implementations of RSA key pair generation we recommend to build in a check for δ + 2β > 7 4
, say. This is always much stronger than the ANSI X9.31 requirements, is very easy to implement, and will only in extremely rare cases imply a performance loss because a key pair is to be rejected.
A suggestion for further work is to investigate whether the ideas of Coppersmith [C2] can be used to improve on the bounds of Boneh and Durfee [BD1] , [BD2] in the situation where the high bits of p and q are known but not necessarily equal. Another suggestion is to investigate the possible improvements to our results when e = n α for an α that is less than 1. Yet another suggestion is to investigate the effects on small private exponent attacks of p/q being close to some rational number (other than 1) with small numerator and denominator.
A Lemma
A key role in all our arguments is played by the following simple lemma.
1/2 > 0 and
The Fermat Factoring Attack
In this section we show that when < n 1/4 (or a bit larger than that), Fermat's method of factoring n is very efficient. To be precise, we show that the complexity of Fermat factoring is O( 2 n 1/2 ). See also [Si] . Let n = pq with p, q primes with p > q, and with difference = p −q < n 1/2 . We assume that n is known, but that p and q are not. In Fermat factoring we try to find positive integers x, y (other than x = n + 1, y = n − 1), such that 4n = x 2 − y 2 . If we succeed, then we put p = 1 2 (x + y) and q = 1 2 (x − y), which are integers > 1 satisfying pq = n. Hence we have factored n. To find such x, y we simply try x = 2n 1/2 , 2n 1/2 +1, 2n 1/2 +2, . . . , until x 2 −4n is a square.
We study the number of values for x that have to be tried as a function of the prime difference . As for each x only a small computation has to be done, this number is a good measure for the complexity of Fermat factoring. This number is x + 1 − 2n 1/2 , which is approximately
by the Lemma from Section 2. It follows immediately that when < cn 1/4 then the number of tries is at most 1 4 c 2 . When c is a (small) constant, this is independent of n (and not too large), and thus factoring n is trivial if, say, < 1000n 1/4 .
Extending the Wiener Attack
We now proceed to study the attack formulated by Wiener [W] , which applies when the private exponent d is less than n 1/4 , and we show that it can be extended from δ < − β. Wiener's attack works as follows. By the definition of e, d there exists a positive integer k such that ed − kφ(n) = 1. We write this as
We know only n and e, and not p, q, φ(n), d or k. However, we do know that . Then we notice that n + 1 − 2n 1/2 is a better approximation to φ(n) than n is. We have not found this information used anywhere in the literature. We find this somewhat surprising, but not too much, since in the general situation the upper bounds |n − φ(n)| < 3n 1/2 and
hold (approximately), and their difference is in the constant only. So the improvement seems not to be too important. However, for us it will be crucial to have the best available approximation to φ(n), as this is where we get the improvements from.
So by n + 1 − φ(n) = p + q and using the Lemma from Section 2 we find
As a result we have from (1), and using e < φ (n) , that
Now we certainly may assume that φ(n) > 3 4
n, and n > 8d. Hence, using = n β and d = n δ we have
and when we now take 2β − − β, then we obtain
So if the condition δ <
is a convergent from the continued fraction expansion of e n+1−2n 1/2 , and we can find it efficiently. As is well known, knowledge of d makes it easy to factor n. This proves our claim. In the Appendix we present an example.
Extending the Boneh and Durfee Attack, I
Boneh and Durfee [BD1] , [BD2] describe an improvement of Wiener's attack that shows that RSA is insecure when δ < 1 − √ 7 = 0.284 . . . , which has a much simpler proof. Full details for their stronger attack are given in [BD2] .
In this section we will show how to extend the weaker result of [BD1] to the case of small prime difference. In the next section we will do the same for the stronger result of [BD2] . Our claim in this section is that RSA is insecure whenever δ <
. At the heart of the method of Boneh and Durfee is the idea to look at the equation ed − kφ(n) = 1 modulo e, and to approximate φ(n) again by n (or n + 1). Actually Boneh and Durfee take into consideration gcd(p − 1, q − 1), but for simplicity we will ignore that. So with A = n + 1 as (known) approximation of φ(n) and s = p + q as the (unknown) error of this approximation, they have an upper bound |s| < e 1/2 (note that e is approximately equal to n, again we freely ignore constants), and so they want to solve the small inverse problem
Then they use LLL to solve this problem. Note that we take the signs of k and s opposite from [BD1] .
Heuristics easily show that the small inverse problem has a unique solution when δ < 1 2 , which then can be used to break RSA. This leads Boneh and Durfee to the belief that this is the true bound for δ below which RSA is insecure.
As we have seen above in extending the Wiener attack, in the case of a small prime difference we have a better approximation to φ(n), namely n+1− 2n 1/2 . So if we take A = n + 1 − 2n 1/2 , then we can take s = p + q − 2n 1/2 , for which by the Lemma of Section 2 we have the much better upper bound |s| < 2 4n 1/2 < e 2β−1/2 (ignoring constants and using e ≈ n). Clearly this is trivial when β ≤ . Then we have to solve the following small inverse problem:
As the values of δ and β are not known, in practical applications upper bounds for them have to be guessed.
The same heuristics used by Boneh and Durfee show that this version of the small inverse problem has a unique solution when δ < 3 2 − 2β. This is why we are tempted to believe that this is the true bound for δ below which RSA is insecure.
We now briefly describe the method of Boneh and Durfee to solve the small inverse problem. Let f (x, y) = x(A + y) − 1. Then we want to solve f (x 0 , y 0 ) ≡ 0 (mod e), |x 0 | < e δ , |y 0 | < e 2β−1/2 . This is done, following an idea of Coppersmith [C1] , by constructing polynomials that have (x 0 , y 0 ) as root modulo e m for some m, and then to make Z-linear combinations of those polynomials, to find a few of them with small coefficients. When the coefficients are small enough, then a result of Howgrave-Graham [HG] shows that (x 0 , y 0 ) actually is a root of f (x, y) over Z.
The polynomials to start from are the so-called
. . , t, for some t. With X = e δ , Y = e 2β−1/2 we now take the polynomials g i,k (xX, yY ), h j,k (xX, yY ) , and study the lattice spanned by their coefficient vectors. All lattice vectors now correspond to polynomials with (x 0 , y 0 ) as root modulo e m , and the theory of lattice basis reduction can be applied to yield both theoretical results about the existence of such polynomials with small coefficients, and practical results on how to efficiently find them. The result of [HG] now shows that this actually yields polynomials of which (x 0 , y 0 ) is a root over Z. When two such independent polynomials have been found, their resultant will most probably have a factor x − x 0 or y − y 0 , which can easily be found.
All we now have to do to solve this variant of the small inverse problem is to work through the arguments of [BD1, Section 4] with for Y the new value e 2β−1/2 . We assume that the reader has this paper available, as in the sequel we merely indicate the changes we make to its arguments, in order to avoid copying lots of details from Boneh and Durfee's papers. In order to guarantee the existence of short enough vectors in the lattice, a condition on the determinant and the dimension has to be fulfilled. For the determinant of the lattice with only x-shifts, which has dimension w = The condition det x det y < e mw , with the dimension w = 1 2
, now leads to the condition
The left hand side is minimal for t = m, and substituting this, we find as condition (after clearing 4β − 1 as denominator, which is positive)
This is equivalent to δ <
, and thus we have proved our claim.
Note that for β = 1 2 we recover Boneh and Durfee's result δ < we find that our condition approaches δ < 1, which clearly is best possible.
Extending the Boneh and Durfee Attack, II
In [BD2, Section B.3], Boneh and Durfee describe how they improved their result δ <
We will now follow their arguments with, as in the previous section, Y = e 2β−1/2 instead of Y = e 1/2 , and again we only indicate changes to the arguments of [BD2] . Our aim is to show that RSA is insecure whenever 2 − 4β < δ < 1 − 2β − ) + 1 ≥ 0, and these conditions are contradictory when δ < 2 − 4β. So we must assume δ > 2 − 4β, and then we can take b = 2 3−4β .
The optimal choice for t is t = k. It follows that
and thus
A direct but somewhat tedious computation, closely following [BD2, Section A final computation then shows that the condition det(L 1 ) = det x det(L y ) < e mw , with det x as in the previous section, is equivalent to δ < 1 − 2β − 1 2 , which proves our claim.
We note that for β = 
Appendix: Examples An Example for the Extended Wiener Attack
As an example let us take for n the 201 digit number n = 1 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00107 67242 [0, 27, 1, 20, 1, 4, 5, 1, 15, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 3, 1, 1, 29, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 3, 2, 1, 3, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 5, 1, 2400, 7, 2, 1, 46, 1, 1, 3, 1, 1, 1, 11, 1, 16, 54, 1, 1, 1, 1, 7, 1, 1, 10, 1, 1, 1, 7, 19, 9, 1, 10, 3, 1, 3, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 30, 1, 2, 1, 19, 5, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 5, 1, 1, 1, 5, 1, 4, 25, 1, 3, 1, 3, 1, 1, 7, 1, 14, 1, 5, 6, 8, 2, 4, 4, 5, 3, 2, 6, 1, 13, 2, 2, 1, 14, 1, 4, 1, 9, 3, 8, 7, 2, 9, 6, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 3, 3, 1, 41, 2, 6, 6, 6, 3, 2, 1, 2, 1, 230, 8, 12, 5, 1, 3, 1, 1, 99, 1, 4, 5, 2, 7, 5, 4, 1, 16, 1, 4, 40, 1, 3, 4, 1, 4, 1, 2, 1, 1, 6, 1, 1, 4, 5, 4, 4, 3, 5, 2, 8, 1, 9, 1, 1, 10, . . . ],
and we see no extraordinarily large one, so Wiener's attack as such will not give a result here. More partial quotients are not useful, since the 200th convergent already has a denominator that is much larger than n 1/4 . The first 200 partial quotients of e n+1−2n 1/2 are [0, 27, 1, 20, 1, 4, 5, 1, 15, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 3, 1, 1, 29, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 3, 2, 1, 3, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 5, 1, 2400, 7, 2, 1, 46, 1, 1, 3, 1, 1, 1, 11, 1, 16, 54, 1, 1, 1, 1, 7, 1, 1, 10, 1, 1, 1, 7, 19, 9, 1, 10, 3, 1, 3, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 30, 1, 2, 1, 19, 5, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 5, 1, 1, 1, 5, 1, 4, 25, 1, 3, 1, 3, 1, 1, 7, 1, 14, 2, 7, 1, 11, 4, 1, 3, 1, 1, 1, 3, 3, 8, 1, 4, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 5, 22, 1, 2, 4, 1, 22, 1, 4, 2, 1, 15, 1, 1, 10, 4, 66, 6, 3, 3, 2, 2, 36, 1, 1, 1, 1, 48, 2, 2, 13, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 10, 2, 1, 1, 2, 5, 1, 29, 1, 12, 1, 56, 11, 147867491, 1, 3, 4, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 6, 3, 1, 3, 1, 2, 1, 5 − β (we did not know this in advance). In Figure 1 a Now we have to decide on the parameters for applying the method of Boneh and Durfee. We do not know the true values of δ and β, but the algorithm requires as input values for X and Y , as well as for m (the highest power of e) and t (the number of y-shifts). So we have to experiment a bit. It appears that in our situation X = e 0.56 , Y = e 0.085 , m = 3, t = 2 gives good results, but we did not do extensive experiments to find out optimal parameters. The choices of X and Y suggest that we expect a result in the neighbourhood of δ = 0.56, β = 0.29.
With these parameters and with A = n+1− 2n 1/2 we built the 18-dimensional lattice from the x-and y-shifts, and started looking for a reduced basis. As programming tool we used Pari v2.0.20beta, see [BBBCO] . This program knows about the concept of partially reduced basis, which is a type of reduced lattice basis that is reduced in a weaker sense than LLL-reduced, but can be computed very quickly. We found that these partially reduced bases can be used for the Boneh and Durfee attack quite well, so this implies a substantial speedup of their method.
In our case of an 18-dimensional lattice with parameters as set above, we reached on our Pentium 800Mhz PC a result in only 43 seconds. To check the speedup we also computed a reduced basis in the LLL sense, which took 6 hours.
From the result we took, as in [BD1] , resultants of the polynomials corresponding to the first two partially reduced basis vectors, and tried to factor these resultants. The resultant with respect to x turned out to have the linear factor y + 15 36705 61801 37046. This suggests that s = p + q − 2n 1/2 = 15 36705 61801 37046, from which a candidate for p + q is easily found. This indeed leads to the factorisation of n, as we leave to the reader to show Alternatively we could have used the resultant with respect to y, which turned out to have the linear factor
